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Abstract
Necessitarianism, as we shall use the term, is the view that natural properties and
causal powers are necessarily connected in some way. In recent decades the most pop-
ular forms of necessitarianism have been the anti-Humean powers-based theories of
properties, such as dispositional essentialism and the identity theory. These versions
of necessitarianism have come under fire in recent years and I believe it is time for
necessitarians to develop a new approach. In this paper I identify unexplored ways
of positing metaphysically necessary connections in nature, using the concepts of
grounding and essential dependence. For example, I show that one could be a neces-
sitarian by insisting that the properties of things necessarily ground their powers, and
that one can maintain this while rejecting dispositional essentialism. Using different
combinations of claims about grounding and essential dependence (or lack thereof), I
map out a spectrum of new positions and compare them to previous theories of natural
modality. Some of these positions are compatible with Humean metaphysics (given
certain readings of Hume’s Dictum) while others are not. The overall aim of the paper
is to provide a new metaphysical framework for understanding theories of powers and
thereby launch a new necessitarian research programme.
Keywords Natural modality · Causal powers · Necessity · Grounding · Dependence
1 Contemporary necessitarianism: dispositional essentialism
and the identity theory
Necessitarianism, as we shall use the term, is the view that there are metaphysically
necessary connections of some sort between a thing’s natural properties and its pow-
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ers.1 Natural properties are the qualities of (or relations between) things. Properties
determine how things are. Powers, as we shall understand them, concern the natural
modal profile of a thing: to say that a thing has a certain power is to say, roughly,
that it can, or would, or must behave in a certain way in certain circumstances. An
example of a natural property is that of having unit negative charge and an example
of a power associated with this property is the disposition to repel other negatively
charged things.2 Necessitarians say that this property metaphysically necessitates this
power.3 In contrast, opponents of necessitarianism, such as Lewis (2009) and Arm-
strong (1983), insist that the connection is metaphysically contingent.4
There are many reasons to be attracted to necessitarianism. For example, it can
provide one with a straightforward answer to the question of why the world exhibits
behavioural order. The answer is that the properties of things necessarily constrain the
powers of those things (or the propensities of things, if the world is not deterministic),
which means that the world’s inhabitants cannot fail to behave in fairly predictable
ways.5 This, in turn, promises to provide firm foundations for our predictive practices
in science. Another benefit of necessitarianism is that it avoids what many take to be
counterintuitive modal consequences of Humean contingentism, such as the possibility
of mass and charge swapping their nomic/causal roles in other possible worlds (see
e.g. Black 2000; Bird 2007, Ch. 4; Mumford 2004, Ch. 6).
There are different theories about the precise nature of the modality associated with
powers/dispositions. For example, some argue that powers are best characterized in
terms of subjunctives (e.g. Bird 2007, Ch. 3), while Vetter (2014) argues that disposi-
tions concern graded ‘can’ possibilities.6 Some flesh out the notion of powers using
1 This version of necessitarianism is closely related to what Bird calls ‘weak necessitarianism’ (Bird 2007,
pp. 49–50). It is weak in the sense that it does not entail that the same laws of nature hold in all possible worlds:
the laws must only hold in the worlds in which the properties in question exist. Thus, weak necessitarianism
is compatible with the possibility of so-called alien properties, which may give rise to powers and laws
that are radically different from those in the actual world. Hence, necessitarianism in my sense should not
be confused with other versions of necessitarianism (such as Wilson’s modal necessitarianism, 2013) on
which the laws of nature are the same in all possible worlds.
2 For the purposes of this paper I shall use the terms ‘powers’ and ‘dispositions’ interchangeably.
3 Note that this necessity claim is distinct from the claim that powers causally necessitate their manifesta-
tions once triggered. That is, necessitarians in my sense can disagree on whether powers causally necessitate
their manifestations. For example, Ellis (2001) is a powers theorist who accepts that powers necessitate their
manifestations, while Schrenk (2010) and Mumford and Anjum (2011) argue that powers do not necessitate
their manifestations.
4 Note also that this contingency claim is compatible with the idea that the connection is naturally or
physically necessary, since these forms of necessity are weaker than metaphysical necessity. For example,
Armstrong’s ‘nomological necessitation’ theory of laws (1983) allows that the properties in our world
might confer different powers in other possible worlds, in virtue of different laws of nature obtaining at
those worlds. Hence, Armstrong is not a necessitarian in my sense.
5 Armstrong (1983) claims that his nomological necessitation theory brings similar benefits, but as we
shall see later, necessitarians usually try to leave us with a more parsimonious ontology (and ideology) than
Armstrong’s. Moreover, many necessitarians think that the governing conception of laws is unworkable
(see e.g. Bird 2007, Ch. 4; Mumford 2004, Ch. 6).
6 To be clear, the claim here is not that powers or dispositions are reductively analysable in terms of,
say, subjunctives or graded possibilities. There are reasons to be sceptical about this reductive project (see
e.g. Martin 1994). Nonetheless, few philosophers would deny that there is an extremely close connection
between power ascriptions and certain kinds of modal ascription. Bird (2007, p. 43), for example, is happy
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causal language (e.g. Shoemaker 1980) or nomic language (e.g. Swoyer 1982; Yates
2013, Sect. 5.3), while others associate powers with a primitive form of dispositional
modality (Mumford and Anjum 2011). For the purposes of this paper, we shall remain
flexible about the precise nature of power modality. There are also many different
theories about the metaphysical status of properties. Some claim that properties form
a fundamental ontological category and view them as universals or (sets of) tropes.
Others accept that properties exist but do not take them to be fundamental, providing
instead ‘nominalist’ analyses using concepts such as set membership. Again, for the
purposes of this paper we shall remain neutral about the precise nature of properties.
One of the reasons for being flexible on these matters is that although most versions
of necessitarianism are in the property realist camp, some are conducive to certain
forms of nominalism. As we shall see, some of the theories to be explored are also
compatible with aspects of Humeanism, depending on how one formulates Hume’s
Dictum. The main aim of this paper, though, is to set out a new conceptual framework
for necessitarianism rather than to commit to a particular version of it.
A crucial question that all necessitarians face is this: what is the source of the
metaphysically necessary connections between properties and powers? One of the
reasons why this question is pressing, and arguably why contingentist theories have
been so popular, is that many find the alleged necessary connections between properties
and powers to be opaque. For example, as Armstrong explains, ‘in trying to discover
the laws of nature, scientists feel free to consider possibilities in a very wide-ranging
manner, quite unlike the constraints which naturally suggest themselves in logical and
mathematical argument’ (1983, p. 158). What Armstrong is getting at here is that it
does not seem difficult to conceive of the properties instantiated in our world behaving
in completely different ways.
In recent decades, the main strategy that necessitarians have employed to deal with
the Armstrongian worry relies heavily on certain claims about the essences or identities
of properties. However, there are reasons for thinking that these necessitarian strategies
have not been successful. The strategy has led to a relatively narrow conception of
necessitarianism and led to views such as dispositional essentialism and the identity
theory of properties, which as we shall see face serious objections. My aim in this paper
is to open up new options for the necessitarians, ones which are based on notions of
metaphysical grounding and essential dependence—relations that plausibly involve
metaphysically necessary connections.
The orthodox necessitarian strategy for powers theorists mirrors that found in
Kripke’s work in Naming and Necessity (1980) on natural kinds. One of Kripke’s
achievements was to persuade many people that there is a distinctive metaphysical
form of necessity that is different from logical necessity, such as the necessity that
water is H2O or that gold is the element with atomic number 79. Importantly, the
source of these metaphysical necessities is the essences or identities of things. Why
is it necessary that H2O is water? A Kripkean answer is that H2O is identical with
water. Why is it necessary that gold has an atomic number of 79? A Kripkean answer
is that this atomic number is an essential property of gold. Kripke himself said little
Footnote 6 continued
to accept that there is a ‘necessary biconditional equivalence’ between power ascriptions and subjunctive
conditionals of a certain kind, even though he is sceptical of reductive analyses of dispositions.
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about cases involving natural properties and powers. However, it is not difficult to see
how the Kripkean strategy can be carried over to the case of powers by necessitarians.
Why is it necessary that mass confers gravitational powers of a certain sort? A neces-
sitarian answer: the property of mass is identical with those gravitational powers; or
if identity is too strong then such powers are at least part of the essence of the mass
property. Prominent advocates of the identity theory of properties, often referred to as
the ‘powerful qualities’ view, include Carruth (2016), Engelhard (2010), Heil (2003),
Ingthorrson (2013), Jacobs (2011), Jaworski (2016), Martin (2008), Schroer (2010),
Strawson (2008) and Taylor (2013).7 Prominent examples of power (or ‘dispositional’)
essentialists about properties include Alvarado (forthcoming), Bird (2007), Dumsday
(2013), Ellis (2001), Ellis and Lierse (1994), Oderberg (2017), Shoemaker (1998),
Swoyer (1982) and Yates (2013). There are also many necessitarians who tend not to
use essentialist language but who nonetheless agree that some natural properties are
individuated, at least in part, by the powers that they confer (e.g. Cartwright 1989;
Chakravartty 2007; Fales 1990; Harré and Madden 1975; Kistler 2002; Marmodoro
2017; Maxwell 1968; McKitrick 2018; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004; Vetter 2015;
Whittle 2008; Williams 2019). Such philosophers therefore count as dispositional
essentialists as we are using the term.8
In the next section I shall briefly rehearse some of the common objections facing
dispositional essentialism and the identity theory of properties. For the purposes of
the discussion I shall assume that the identity theory of properties and dispositional
essentialism are distinct views, since (for example) dispositional essentialists like Bird
(2007) reject Heil’s identity theory (2003). In a recent paper, Taylor (2018) argues
that on close inspection the theories of Bird and Heil are difficult to distinguish, but
examining this issue in detail would distract us from the main business of the paper.9
I shall also not consider potential responses to the objections discussed in the next
section, since they have been discussed in detail elsewhere (see e.g. Barker 2013; Jaag
2014). To repeat, the main purpose of the paper is to open up conceptual space for
new fruitful work on necessitarianism using the contemporary notions of grounding
and essential dependence. We shall begin this task in Sect. 3. Even if one does not
think that the identity and dispositional essentialist theories are as problematic as I
do, I hope that one will see the value of exploring new versions of necessitarianism
against which the merits of other theories of natural modality can be compared.
7 This identity view is not to be confused with the identity theory about dispositions, held by Armstrong
(1973; see also Lewis 1997). Armstrong’s theory is sometimes described as the view that dispositions are
(contingently) identical with their categorical causal bases. However, strictly speaking, on Armstrong’s
theory dispositions are also constituted by the nomic relations in which categorical properties stand.
8 Care is needed, though, because ‘dispositional essentialism’ is a slippery term. In this paper I take
dispositional essentialism to be a thesis about the nature of natural properties, such as mass and charge.
However, Ellis and Lierse (1994), who were among the first to use the term ‘dispositional essentialism’
take the further essentialist step of claiming that natural kinds have essential dispositional properties (see
also Dumsday 2013). For the purposes of this paper we need not discuss this further debate about natural
kinds, since dispositional essentialism about properties is sufficient for a necessitarian powers theory.
9 I note, though, that given I think the identity theory is problematic, it wouldn’t make any difference (as far
as this paper is concerned) if some versions of dispositional essentialism collapse into the identity theory.
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2 Familiar problems facing dispositional essentialism
and the identity theory
Let us start with dispositional essentialism, the view that natural property types have
a dispositional essence—an essence that is modal and relational. As mentioned ear-
lier, there is disagreement about the precise nature of this modality but perhaps the
most widely held view is that dispositional essences should be fleshed out in terms of
subjunctive conditionals (e.g. Bird 2007, Ch. 3). Another important feature of dispo-
sitional essentialism is that its advocates are strong actualists about modality, which
means they wish to ground modal talk in the properties of concrete objects rather than,
say, possible worlds (e.g. Vetter 2015). The most detailed articulation of contemporary
dispositional essentialism is to be found in the work of Bird (2007), which builds on
work by Ellis (2001) and Mumford (2004).
In recent years, the most common complaint raised against Bird-type dispositional
essentialism is that it harbours a structural problem. This worry has been raised by
Barker (2013) and articulated in detail by Jaag (2014). Roughly, the worry is that
it is difficult to see how the properties of objects could both ground modal facts
about those objects and at the same time be essentially dependent on those facts.
Prominent philosophers in the literature on essence have been sceptical of the idea
that anything could ground that on which it essentially depends (see e.g. Jaag 2014,
Sect. 3; Fine 2015, p. 297). If the properties of things ground facts about natural
modality (such as subjunctive facts), then those modal facts are plausibly derivative
entities. Indeed, one of the benefits of dispositional essentialism is precisely supposed
to be that it explains away the laws of nature (e.g. Bird 2007, Ch. 9; see also Mumford
2004). But if natural modality is derivative, it is difficult to see how properties—which
dispositional essentialists take to be fundamental—could be essentially dependent on
natural modality, for this would mean that something fundamental (a property) has an
essence which is not itself fundamental (again see Jaag 2014, Sect. 3 for details). If
properties have a non-fundamental, derivative essence, then surely the properties will
be derivative. But not everything can be derivative!
What options do the dispositional essentialists have? The objection above rests in
part on the idea that grounded entities are derivative relative to their grounds—which
depends in turn on the asymmetry of grounding (more on this later). One option for
the dispositional essentialists is to question this assumption and accept the idea that
properties and natural modality might be equally fundamental and stand in a sym-
metric relationship of ontological dependence. This suggestion is explored by Yates
(2018, Sect. 4) and Jaag (2014, pp. 12–13), but the notion of symmetric ontological
dependence remains controversial. Another option is to reverse the grounding claim
and maintain that facts of natural modality ground the properties of things rather than
vice versa. This view would be consistent with the claim that properties have a dis-
positional essence. We shall discuss this option more in Sect. 6. However, for current
purposes we should note that this theory comes at the cost of making properties non-
fundamental. Such a view would therefore not be attractive for those who hold that
universals or tropes form a fundamental ontological category–which includes most (if
not all) dispositional essentialists. Moreover, it is far from clear that such a view can
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provide an illuminating account of modality, since natural modal facts end up being
primitive.
For these reasons, one might be tempted by the identity theory of properties, on
which properties are said to be powerful qualities. I take it that this is a distinct
and simpler theory than Bird-type dispositional essentialism. Identity theorists tend
not to flesh out powers in subjunctive or relational terms, as Bird does, and identity
theorists such as Heil and Martin tend to avoid the terminology of essence altogether.
Moreover, Heil and Martin accept that properties are qualitative, a claim that Bird and
his followers typically resist. According to the identity view, properties and powers are
equally fundamental: properties are at once qualitative and modal. Heil summarises
the view as follows (2003, p. 111):
Identity: a property P’s dispositionality, Pd, is P’s qualitativity, Pq, and each of these
is P: Pd  Pq  P
Unfortunately, for all its benefits the identity theory faces some fundamental objec-
tions—objections that are distinct from Jaag’s criticisms of dispositional essentialism.
The main challenge is that many find it difficult to see how qualitative properties and
powers can be identical. Qualitative properties and powers appear to have different
features, which suggests they are non-identical (see e.g. Barker 2013, p. 649; Williams
2019, pp. 115–116). Armstrong, for example, takes an incredulous tone when he says
that qualities and powers ‘are just different, that’s all’ (2005, p. 315) and that if one is
going to identify qualities and powers, one might ‘as well identify a raven with a writ-
ing desk’ (Armstrong 2004, p. 141). What, though, are the specific reasons for thinking
that qualitative properties and powers are distinct? As Taylor (2018) has pointed out,
some of the reasons given in the literature are bad reasons because they beg the ques-
tion against the identity theory. For instance, in places Armstrong defines qualities (or
what he calls ‘categorical’ properties) precisely as non-dispositional properties (1997,
p. 69), which of course makes the identity theory sound contradictory. But this will not
worry the identity theorists, because their view is precisely that qualitative properties
are dispositional.
A better version of the Armstrongian complaint is one that focuses on the ways
in which different qualities and different powers are distinguished. Even if powers
are essentially tied to qualities in some way, power types are typically identified and
distinguished in relational terms, by the manifestations that they are powers for (see e.g.
Bird 2007; Lowe 2010). For instance, to know what the power of fragility is just is to
know that fragility is the power to break. Indeed, even Heil, himself an identity theorist,
concedes that powers are identified relationally because it is this fact that generates
an alleged regress problem facing Bird’s version of dispositional essentialism (Heil
2003, Ch. 10). In contrast, it seems that qualities have a self-contained, non-modal
essence; an intrinsic suchness. We can understand what, say, the quality of sphericality
is without reference to anything else. Qualities are self-individuating, one might say.
Ingthorrson (2013) has offered one of the most detailed responses to the worry just
outlined, and his response is that these different modes of identification of qualities
and powers merely reflect an epistemological or conceptual difference, rather than a
metaphysical difference. On his view, the best thing for an identity theorist to say is
that we can single out a property in thought in one of two ways: either directly, as
when we, say, directly perceive a shape, or indirectly via the effects that the property
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instance produces in other things. When we single out a property in the former way, we
identify it qualitatively, but when we use the latter method we identify it powerfully.
I agree that Ingthorsson’s response is a natural route for the identity theorist to take
but the problem is that the theory then becomes more about epistemology than meta-
physics, which compromises its status as thoroughgoing necessitarianism. Of course,
the metaphysical thesis that properties are at once qualitative and dispositional can
be consistently held alongside the epistemic point that there are qualitative and dis-
positional ways of conceptualising or picking out those properties. However, if one
tries to demystify the identity claim by understanding it in the way that Ingthorrson
does, as an epistemological claim, then the theory ends up saying little about the
underlying metaphysical nature of properties. As Molnar complains (2003, p. 154),
this makes it difficult to see how the identity theory differs in a significant way from
a view that Mumford (1998) called ‘neutral monism’.10 Such a theory is more about
modes of presenting properties and is metaphysically neutral about the nature of prop-
erties themselves. It is therefore difficult to see on what basis a neutral monist can
say that there are metaphysically necessary connections between the qualitative and
dispositional aspects of properties.
Now that we have briefly considered problems with orthodox forms of necessitar-
ianism—the dispositional essentialist and identity theories—let us begin to explore
some different options.
3 Necessitarianismwith grounding
Rather than being underpinned by property identities or property essences, neces-
sary connections can be underpinned instead by relations of grounding. To say that X
grounds Y is to say that Y exists in virtue of X. Grounding is a metaphysical determina-
tion relation that provides an explanation for why something is so. We shall take it that,
first and foremost, grounding is a relation between entities in the world.11 A common
example of grounding is that the existence of a set is grounded in the existence of its
members. Importantly for our purposes, the orthodox view of grounding is that if X
fully grounds Y, then it is metaphysically necessary that Y exists if X does. Among
those who favour this necessitarian view of grounding are Audi (2012a), Dasgupta
(2014), deRosset (2010), Fine (2015), Rosen (2010) and Trogdon (2013). The main
reason for accepting grounding necessitarianism is that full grounds are supposed to
fully determine and metaphysically explain that which they ground. But if the rela-
tionship between grounded entities and their full grounds is contingent, it is difficult
to see how those grounds can provide a complete metaphysical explanation for that
which they ground.12 For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume this orthodox
10 This sort of worry has also been raised by Jacobs (2011, p. 89).
11 I have no objection to those who also speak of true propositions being grounded, as Fine does in his earlier
work. However, I take it that grounding structures between propositions obtain because of the grounding
structures in concrete reality.
12 As is the case with any philosophical principle, the orthodoxy has been questioned. For example, Skiles
(2015) has discussed what he takes to be counterexamples to grounding necessitarianism. Unfortunately,
due to space limitations I must deal with Skiles’ concerns elsewhere. However, it is worth noting that even
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necessaritarian view about full grounding. It follows from this assumption that we
could be necessitarians (in the sense defined earlier) by accepting that the properties
of things fully ground their powers (or vice versa).13
As we shall see in the next section, grounding commitments still leave room for
further claims about essential dependence. Different combinations of grounding and
essence claims (or lack thereof) yield a spectrum of new necessitarian positions, many
of which avoid objections facing the orthodox approaches discussed in the previous
section. My aim is not to choose between the theories discussed, though I will raise
some preliminary points in favour of the grounding approach developed in this section.
In Sect. 5 we shall consider the senses in which the grounding theories are and are not
compatible with Humean metaphysics.
So far we have seen how grounding is a metaphysical determination relation that
provides an explanation for why something is so. Since that which is grounded depends
in some way on its (full) grounds, it is plausible that that which is grounded is less
fundamental than its grounds. Hence, grounding relations are said to impose a partial
ordering on reality. This ordering is generated by the fact that grounding is plausibly
asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive. Although these formal features have occasion-
ally been questioned in the literature, I shall assume the orthodox view of grounding
for the purposes of this paper.14 It should be emphasized that to say that grounded
entities are derivative is not to say that grounded entities do not exist, as Schaffer
emphasizes (2009, Sect. 2). For example, one might flesh out physicalism about the
mental as the view that mental properties are grounded in physical properties, but
such a view does not imply that mental properties do not really exist; it says only
that mental properties exist in virtue of physical properties (see Schaffer 2017 for a
detailed development of ‘grounding’ physicalism). Note also that grounding is not the
same thing as entailment. For example, a grounding physicalist can maintain that men-
tal states are grounded in physical states without accepting that physical descriptions
entail mental descriptions. And in the current case, a grounding-based necessitarian
can accept that qualitative properties ground powers without accepting that qualitative
property predications, such as ‘x is spherical’, entail power predications, such as ‘x
has the power to roll’ (more on this later). Finally, and in line with Audi (2012a, b),
Footnote 12 continued
if Skiles’ counterexamples are successful, his criticisms are compatible with the claim that full grounding
occurs with metaphysical necessity in some cases. None of his counterexamples involve cases of properties
grounding powers (or vice versa).
13 Henceforth, whenever I use the term ‘ground’ I shall mean ‘fully ground’ unless otherwise indicated. To
be clear, this ‘full’ notion of grounding is different to the notion of realization that is sometimes employed
in the dispositions literature. For example, according to Prior et al. (1982) dispositions are higher-order
properties: properties of having first-order properties which play certain causal roles. Higher-order properties
are sometimes described as being ‘grounded in’ first-order properties (e.g. Heil 2012, p. 60). However, on
close inspection it is clear that the theory of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson can only involve partial grounding
at best. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson hold that the relationship between dispositions and their realizers is
contingent and varies with the (contingent) laws of nature (1982, pp. 253–254). Hence, the theory of Prior,
Pargetter and Jackson should not be included among the grounding-based theories of necessitarianism
discussed in this paper.
14 For example, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) argues that grounding is neither transitive, nor irreflexive, nor
asymmetric. Thompson (2016) also questions the asymmetry of grounding. As I note in Sect. 8, if some
of these formal features turn out to be different then the spectrum of possible positions in Fig. 1 would be
larger than that presented here.
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we shall assume that grounded entities are not reducible (in the metaphysical sense)
to their grounds. This claim is plausible if one accepts, as I do, that cases of ontolog-
ical reduction involve identity. As Audi points out (2012b, p. 110), cases of identity
cannot involve grounding given the irreflexivity of grounding.15 If this is right, then a
grounding necessitarian can maintain, as most necessitarians do, that powers are real,
irreducible feature of reality.
Is grounding a primitive relation (‘Big ‘G” grounding) or can grounding necessities
be realized in different ways by a variety of other metaphysical relations (‘small ‘g”
relations)? Candidate ‘small g’ relations include those that hold between parts and
wholes, truths and truthmakers, types and tokens, sets and their members, determinates
and determinables and so on (see Wilson 2014; Bennett 2017 for further discussion).
I lean towards the ‘big G’ approach but due to space limitations I cannot attempt to
settle this debate here. The important assumption for our purposes is that some entities
exist in virtue of others and do so as a matter of metaphysical necessity. Fortunately,
this is something that ‘small ‘g” and ‘big ‘G” theorists can agree on. Proponents of
either position will, for example, accept that sets exist in virtue of their members and
are necessitated by them. For necessitarians who favour a ‘small g’ approach, one
could, for example, appeal to the notion of constitution in order to develop the claim
that powers exist in virtue of properties (or vice versa), providing that constitution is
not the same thing as identity. The idea then would be that property instantiations are
what constitute certain modal facts about objects (or vice versa).
Now, for those seeking a version of necessitarianism based on grounding, a core
thesis is as follows:
The grounding theory of powers: For all properties and all powers of things, each
power of a thing is fully grounded by some property (or properties) of that thing.
The main difference between this necessitarian theory and the approaches criticized
earlier is that an advocate of the grounding theory should reject the claim that the
properties of things are identical with, or essentially dependent on, the powers of
those things. Grounding is generative and (plausibly) asymmetric, whereas identity
is a symmetric and non-generative relation. Hence, as explained earlier, one cannot
consistently maintain that the relation between the properties and powers of things
is both grounding and identity. Similarly, for reasons already explained, one cannot
coherently claim that the properties of things ground the powers of those things while
also maintaining that those properties are essentially dependent on the powers. Again,
the orthodox view in the grounding literature is that grounded entities are derivative
from, which is to say less fundamental than, their grounds. Thus, if properties were
essentially dependent on powers, the grounding theorist would have to commit to the
bizarre claim that natural properties, which form a fundamental ontological category,
have non-fundamental essences (see again Jaag 2014, Sect. 3 for details). The upshot
is that if we accept the grounding theory, we must accept that properties have a non-
dispositional essence.
15 Recall that a grounded entity (call it y) is said to be less metaphysically fundamental than that which
grounds it (call it x). But if x is identical with y then surely y cannot be less fundamental than x. Rather, if
x is identical with y, then x and y are equally fundamental.
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There are, however, at least two ways in which a property can have a non-
dispositional essence. To borrow terminology from Hildebrand (2016), one option
is to say that properties have ‘bare quiddities’, which is to say that there is nothing
more than a bare numerical difference between properties. The other option is to say
that properties are have a thick, qualitative nature—a view that Hildebrand calls ‘qual-
itative quidditism’.16 Hildebrand provides several general arguments for the claim that
qualitative quidditism is the most plausible form of quidditism. However, in the con-
text of the grounding theory of powers, there is a specific reason for preferring the
qualitative view. If properties are bare and there are no qualitative differences between
them, then it would seem a mystery as to why properties necessitate the specific powers
that they do, rather than others (see Smith 2016, p. 249, who makes a similar point). In
contrast, if properties are qualitative, one can maintain that the powers are constrained
by the specific qualitative natures of the relevant properties (more on this below).
This qualitative grounding theory is so simple that it is surprising it has not received
more attention in the vast literature on natural modality. This is perhaps because the
contemporary notion of grounding has only been developed and refined in recent
years. As far as I know, I was one of the first to propose the idea that qualitative
properties fully ground powers (Tugby 2012),17 but at the time I did not develop the
idea in any detail. Jaag (2014, Sect. 4.2) appears to be the first to discuss some of the
different grounding theories that are available, but devotes only a few pages to the
issue. More recently, Audi (2012b, p. 117), Smith (2016, pp. 250–251), Yates (2018,
Sect. 4), Kimpton-Nye (2018, Ch. 3), Azzano (2019, p. 348), Giannotti (2019, pp. 6-
7), Contessa (2019, Sect. 6) and Coates (2020) have discussed specific theories that
might qualify as grounding theories in one way or another. However, as far as I know,
this is the first paper to offer a detailed systematic analysis of the different grounding
and dependence theories that are available.
Before introducing other unexplored versions of necessitarianism, let us offer some
further clarifications about the grounding theory before explaining why necessitarians
might find it attractive. As mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this paper we may
use the terms ‘property’ and ‘power’ in a flexible way, which leaves open a variety
of ways of developing the grounding theory and should make it attractive to a variety
of necessitarians. Most necessitarians are realists about properties in one sense or
another. Thus, the properties that ground powers could be, for example, module tropes
or modifier tropes (Garcia 2015), or immanent universals or transcendent universals.
The grounding claim is compatible with all of these theories of properties as far as
16 See also Locke (2012) and Smith (2016) for detailed discussions of the different ways in which quiddities
can be characterized.
17 I wrote: ‘It is … purely the qualitative aspects of a thing’s properties which ground its dispositions’
(2012, p. 278). In that paper I categorized this theory as a version of dispositional essentialism, but for
reasons explained in the discussion of Jaag’s paper above, I now think that was a mistake. As should be
clear in the current paper, the grounding theory of powers and dispositional essentialism provide very
different options. In 2012 I briefly fleshed out the grounding claim by appealing to Jacobs’ claim (2011)
that property instantiations are truthmakers for counterfactuals. There I was assuming that truthmaking is a
grounding relation (in line with e.g. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005; Schaffer 2008). However, it has been argued
recently that truthmaking is not a case of grounding (Audi 2019) and in this paper I have avoided fleshing
out the notion of grounding in this way.
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I can tell. And as we shall see in Sect. 6, there is also a different grounding theory
which can be formulated using a nominalist approach to properties.
The question of what we mean by ‘power’ affects the kind of grounding that is
involved in the theory. As we saw above, what is uncontroversial is that powers are
modal entities of some sort, since they determine what is naturally possible for an
object. But the nature of this modality will affect whether, for example, our notion
of grounding is of the flat or dimensioned variety. Grounding theorists draw this
distinction to separate cases in which a grounded entity is in the same ontological
category as that which grounds it (‘flat’ grounding) and cases in which a grounded
entity is in a different ontological category to that which grounds it (‘dimensioned’
grounding; see e.g. Schaffer 2009, pp. 375–376). For the purposes of the discussion
below I shall for convenience assume that a thing’s instantiating a property and a
thing’s possessing a power are both facts or states of affairs of a certain sort. I shall
therefore assume a flat notion of grounding in the case of properties and powers.
However, nothing crucial turns on this issue. I accept that the notion of dimensioned
grounding is coherent and occurs in many cases, as when Socrates (a concrete entity)
grounds the singleton set containing Socrates (an abstract entity). If necessitarians
wish to deny that the possession of a power is a fact, and prefer instead a dimensioned
theory of grounding, the general theory we are considering would still be available.
Another clarification is that we may remain neutral on whether the necessary cor-
relations between properties and powers are one-to-one. There is no a priori reason
why an entity should not ground more than one entity. The grounding theory could,
for example, accept that a single property instantiation grounds multiple powers. For
this reason, we should not go as far as to suggest that powers are ever fully indi-
viduated by the qualitative properties that ground them.18 Moreover, we might also
want to accept cases in which a single power is collectively grounded in more than
one property instantiation, such as a needle’s power to pierce linen, which is arguably
grounded in the needle’s rigidity as well as its shape. Cases of extrinsic dispositions
(McKitrick 2003), such as weight, also provide a stock of examples of dispositions
that do not depend on a single property instantiation.19 Finally, the grounding theory
could in principle accept that different kinds of property fully ground the same kind
of power, meaning that power types are multiply realizable. Thus, the grounding the-
ory has flexibility in a way that some other versions of necessitarianism, such as the
identity theory, does not have.
What, then, are some of the advantages of the grounding theory? I believe there are
many but I’ll just raise a small number of related points here. As explained, my main
aim is to explore the conceptual landscape of necessitarianism rather than to argue
for a specific view. What seems clear, though, is that the grounding theory discussed
avoids the problems facing the essentialist and identity theories discussed in Sect. 2.
Since the grounding theorist need not (and should not) say that properties essentially
depend on powers, they avoid the structural problem raised by Jaag in relation to
Bird-type dispositional essentialism. And since grounding is not the same thing as
18 This would be implausible in any case, for again it is widely accepted that powers are individuated in
part by the manifestations that they are powers for (see e.g. Bird 2007; Lowe 2010; Tugby 2013).
19 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
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identity, it avoids the incoherence worry facing the identity theory. The incoherence
worry raised by Barker and others, to recall, is that it is difficult to see how that which
fixes the identity of a property can be both non-modal (i.e. qualitative) and modal (i.e.
dispositional) (Barker 2013, p. 649). It is clear that the grounding theory avoids this
worry, because it can accept that properties and powers are individuated in different
ways. According to the grounding theory, qualitative properties are not identical with
powers but rather ground powers. On this view, qualitative properties and powers are
intimately connected but nonetheless numerically distinct: qualitative properties are
fundamental while powers are not.
Perhaps the most obvious advantage is that the grounding theory offers a straight-
forward actualist theory of natural modality. Actualism is a naturalistic account of
modality since it maintains that only the actual world—the one we inhabit—exists. A
quick look at the literature on actualism reveals that it is often expressed precisely as a
view about the grounding of modality. For example, Vetter finds it natural to describe
what she calls ‘New Actualism’ using the terminology of grounding: ‘their shared aim
is to identify, within the actual world, the grounds, source, or truthmaker of modal
truths’ (2011, p. 742). So, if one finds actualism attractive as a general approach to
modality, then the view that properties ground natural modality seems an obvious one
to pursue. Importantly, as we saw in Sect. 2, if we want to uphold this grounding claim,
there are good reasons to reject the dispositional essentialist theory of properties.
Unlike the orthodox versions of necessitarianism, I think that the grounding theory
also promises to avoid worries concerning the nature of powers (see Barker 2013 for a
range of objections). Importantly, the grounding theory does this while leaving us with
all the benefits that necessitarianism brings (see Sect. 1). I suspect that many disposi-
tional essentialists and identity theorists are attracted to their views precisely because
they provide a means of being a necessitarian. If that is the case, then I recommend
that such theorists convert to the grounding theory. Here is one example of a challenge
facing both dispositional essentialists and identity theorists20: Powers are undoubtedly
modal entities but it is difficult to see how a modal entity, which concerns not what is
the case but what could or would or must be the case, can be part of the furniture of
fundamental reality. Indeed, subjunctives with false antecedents are precisely called
counterfactuals and it seems almost oxymoronic to say that counterfactuals are fun-
damental facts which obtain. In my view, this is probably why many have found the
idea that powers are both actual and fundamental to be obscure. For example, Psillos
(2006, p. 138) complains that on Bird’s dispositional essentialist theory of properties,
properties have to lead a mysterious ‘dual life’: on one hand they have to fix how an
object constitutively is, while on the other hand they must, as powers, somehow look
beyond the object and determine which behavioural manifestations are possible for it.
For the same reasons, it could be argued that the identity theory is mysterious, since
as we saw earlier it requires the self-same entity to have what looks like two different
essences. I think part of the problem here is that powers are being interpreted as enti-
ties which are both modal and fundamental. If we really are going to be full-blooded
actualists, then a more natural stance is to say that modal facts (in this case powers) are
20 There are many others. For example, strong versions of dispositional essentialism face a variety of power
regress problems (see e.g. Bird 2007, Ch. 6; Lowe 2010). Given that the grounding theories above take
properties to be qualitative, these regress problems are likely to be avoided.
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not themselves fundamental but are grounded in concrete entities that are fundamental
(in this case qualitative properties).
Of course, the grounding theory sketched here will no doubt face objections, some
of which have already been raised on the rare occasions in which grounding neces-
sitarianism has been discussed. For example, Jaag (2014, Sect. 4.2.5) has suggested
that versions of dispositionalism based on grounding will face an ‘inference problem’.
If property descriptions do not entail power descriptions, then why should we accept
that qualitative properties ground powers? The link between qualities and powers is
opaque, it might be urged. Although it is not my aim to offer a detailed defence of
any of the theories discussed in this paper, my suspicion is that there are good lines of
response to this sort of objection, one that can draw inspiration from Schaffer’s recent
work on ‘grounding’ physicalism (2017). Let me briefly explain.
As Schaffer discusses, physicalism is also criticised on the basis that the link
between the physical and the mental is not ‘transparent’. For example, it seems that
physical descriptions do not entail mental descriptions, which suggests there is a prob-
lematic explanatory gap for the physicalists. However, Schaffer argues that this is not
a good objection to versions of physicalism on which the physical grounds the mental.
This is because even in uncontroversial cases of grounding, the grounding relations are
not always ‘transparent’ is the way that critics of physicalism demand. For example,
in cases in which parts compose (ground) wholes, it is not transparent that certain
wholes must exist if certain parts do (Schaffer 2017, p. 7).
What conclusions should we draw from this? The answer is that it is rarely (if ever)
the case that descriptions of grounds entail descriptions of the grounded, and grounding
claims are rarely (if ever) based on claims about such entailments. Rather, grounding
is a metaphysical relation that is abductively posited for theoretical reasons in cases
where one phenomenon correlates with another. Grounding relations are not some-
how deduced from descriptions of the grounds. As explained earlier, the modality of
grounding is that of metaphysical necessity. The metaphysical necessity of grounded
entities, given the existence of their grounds, is perfectly compatible with the logical or
conceptual possibility of grounding entities existing in the absence of grounded enti-
ties. This is in part why Schaffer believes that the so-called ‘conceivability’ objections
against physicalism do not stand up against grounding physicalism (2017, pp. 16–18).
Importantly, I see no obvious reasons why grounding theorists about powers should
not be able to make analogous moves against analogous objections.
In response, opponents might still complain that it is an act of faith to suppose that
there is a relation of grounding between properties and powers. Grounding, to recall,
is supposed to be a determination relation that underpins metaphysical explanation.
But what reasons are there for thinking that properties—considered as non-modal
entities—are eligible for explaining modal entities like powers? Or to put the worry in
another way, what grounds the fact that properties ground powers? In the absence of
such reasons the grounding relation begins to look mysterious, in which case perhaps
a necessitarian would be better off accepting that the necessary connections between
properties and powers are brute.21
21 This is a position that Barker calls ‘brute modalism’ (2013, p. 611).
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In response, I note firstly that in various historical periods of philosophy there
has been considerable support for the idea that modal features necessarily flow from
entities whose constitutive essence is non-modal. For example, according to Aquinas’s
hylemorphism, the soul has a non-dispositional essence but nonetheless necessarily
causes various powers (see e.g. Wippel 2000, pp. 266–275).22 So, I suspect that the
objection above is partly a product of Humean influences in recent philosophy. But
putting the historical points aside, I believe the best way to defend the explanatory
connection between qualitative properties and their associated powers is to insist that
the connection is indeed transparent in many cases, despite the fact that grounding
does not involve entailment. Consider, for example, structural properties, which are
prominent in both everyday life and in natural science. The roundness of a ball or the
tetrahedral structure of silane provide examples. These are paradigmatic examples of
non-dispositional properties because they arguably have a geometrical essence rather
than a dispositional essence. For this reason some dispositional essentialists, such as
Ellis (2002, p. 173), accept that structural properties do not fall under the dispositional
essentialist thesis. Yet, it seems clear that the nature of a structural property determines
which causal powers are associated with it.23 This is not a brute fact. Rather, by
reflecting on worldly cases, we can see why certain structural properties confer certain
powers rather than others. As Weissman once put it, it is obvious why it is contradictory
to think one can ‘fill a round hole with a square peg’ (1978, p. 292). The geometry
of the case constrains the causal possibilities, and Weissman argues that this happens
throughout nature. The fact that a key shaped in a certain way can unlock some
locks rather than others is not simply a brute fact but rather is explained, in part, by
the geometries of the complementary interactions of lock and key (Weissman 1978,
p.289). Similar examples can be given in the case of molecular structure. It is not
surprising that hydrogen and carbon have the reciprocal powers to produce CH4 rather
than CH5. Covalent bonding behaviour is constrained by the number of electrons and
free electron spaces in the relevant shells. The formation of CH4 is explained in part
by the fact that carbon has four electrons in its outer shell while a hydrogen atom has
just one.
In these cases, then, there seems to be no particular mystery about why the structural
properties are fit for grounding certain powers rather than others. If one likes talk of
meta-grounding, one could simply say that these grounding facts are grounded in the
properties themselves (see e.g. Bennett 2011 for details about this meta-grounding
strategy). Of course, things are not so straightforward in the case of the fundamental
properties of physics, because it seems less likely that we have epistemic access to their
qualitative natures,24 in which case the relevant explanatory connections will have to
22 I am grateful to Can Laurens Loewe and Dominik Perler for drawing my attention to this historical
connection (among others). I have also learnt from John Marenbon that, more generally, the notion of
necessary-but-non-essential accidents was popular in the medieval period, especially in the work of Porphyry
(see the Isagoge, Barnes 2003).
23 Such examples have been discussed by Heil (2003, p. 86), Kimpton-Nye (2018, Ch. 3) and Coates
(2020), among others.
24 But even here there is a debate to be had. As a referee has pointed out, if ontic structural realism is correct,
then all fundamental properties will be structural in some sense. So, it might yet turn out that the kinds of
explanatory examples discussed earlier—where structures ground powers – are pervasive at fundamental
123
Synthese
be posited for purely theoretical reasons. This would hardly be surprising, though,
given that the properties in question are themselves theoretical, as are the grounding
relations that are posited. In any case, my aim here has merely been to respond to the
worry that it is a mystery how non-modal entities could ever ground and explain modal
entities. I accept that this is an issue that requires more attention than I have been able
to give it in this paper, and I welcome further work on it. Nonetheless, I hope to have
done enough to motivate the idea that structural properties, which plausibly have a
geometrical essence, necessarily constrain a range of powers in a transparent way.
Powers, we might say, are necessary consequences of such properties even though
they do not constitute those properties.25
4 Necessitarianismwith grounding and essential dependence
Our discussions in the previous two sections show that if we are to hold that properties
ground powers, then there are reasons not to say that properties have a powerful
essence, on pain of metaphysical incoherence. However, as the work of Fine (2015,
pp. 306–307) and others shows, it is perfectly coherent for there to be a relation
of essential dependence in the opposite direction, which is to say that a grounded
entity might be essentially dependent on that which grounds it.26 So, the grounding
necessitarian has the option to accept that powers are essentially dependent on the
properties that ground them. As we shall now see, this issue turns on the question of
whether powers are multiply realizable. But before addressing the issue of multiple
realizability, let us introduce the notion of essential dependence in more detail.
To say that Y essentially depends on X is to say that X is part of the essence of Y.
In order to begin to know what an entity is, we need to know about the entities upon
which it essentially depends. For instance, in order to understand what a certain set is,
we need to understand that a set is essentially dependent on the members it contains.
If this is correct, then we cannot fully explain what a specific set is without speci-
fying the members that it contains. Given that relations of essential dependence are
explanatory in this way, they are plausibly asymmetric in the same way that grounding
relations plausibly are. For if they were symmetric, this would leave us with circular
metaphysical explanations, which most take to be unacceptable.27 For this reason,
Footnote 24 continued
levels. This would require, in the current framework, that the relevant structures are non-modal. I would
welcome further work on this form of structural realism.
25 It is tempting to say, on this theory, that powers are the consequential essences of properties. However,
in contemporary metaphysics the notion of consequential essence is normally associated with logical con-
sequences rather than metaphysical consequences (see Fine 1995a, p. 57). There might be parallels, though,
with the Aristotelian notion of propria, which concerns the accidental but necessary consequences of a
natural kind. In the current case, the necessary consequences are those of structural properties rather than
natural kinds.
26 Indeed, Fine has suggested that it will always be the case that grounded entities are essentially dependent
on their grounds (2015, pp. 306–307). But as we shall see, in the current context such a principle rules out
the possibility of the multiple realization of powers, which some necessitarians might wish to accept.
27 Recently, Thompson (2016) and Barnes (2018) have resisted orthodoxy and argued that circular meta-
physical explanations are acceptable in some cases (see also Yates 2018). Unfortunately I do not have the
space here to discuss their arguments. However, I note that Barnes and Thompson do not argue that all
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Fine (2015, p. 297), Lowe (1998, Ch. 6) and others claim that all relations of ontolog-
ical dependence are asymmetric. Another orthodox view about essential dependence
is that when such a relation holds it does so as a matter of metaphysical necessity.
This has to be the case because if the relation were contingent, it would be accidental
and thereby contradict the idea that the dependee is part of the essence of the depen-
der. However, as Fine famously argues, it is not plausible that the concept of essence
can be reduced to the concept of metaphysical necessity, because there are cases of
metaphysical necessitation that are not cases of essence. Indeed, grounding necessities
are a case in point: as Fine argues (1994), the existence of Socrates necessitates the
existence of the singleton containing Socrates, but it is implausible to think that one
needs to appeal to the singleton when specifying the essence of Socrates.28
If we accept the grounding version of necessitarianism discussed in the previous
section, a certain claim about essential dependence might then seem plausible, which
is that it is part of the essence of a power that it is grounded in a certain type of
qualitative property rather than some other. For example, one might think it cannot
simply be a brute necessary fact that, say, the power to roll is grounded in sphericality
rather than some other shape property. Again, a comparison with Fine’s infamous case
of grounding is useful here, in which Socrates grounds the singleton set containing
Socrates. Is it a brute fact that this particular singleton is grounded by Socrates rather
than some other entity? Fine’s answer is a resounding ‘no’: ‘…it should somehow
be part of the nature of singleton Socrates that its existence is to be determined in
this way from the existence of Socrates’ (2015, p. 297). Fine argues that this sort of
principle generalizes because it is implausible to think that grounding relations are
unconstrained by the natures (i.e. essences) of the grounded entities.
So, Finean considerations favour the idea that if the properties of things ground
their powers, then powers are essentially dependent on those properties that ground
them. On the other hand, if powers are not strictly essentially dependent on those
qualitative properties, the theory would be compatible with the multiple realizability
of powers, which some theorists might be willing to endorse. This multiple realizability
view would still count as a version of necessitarianism, as I have defined it, because
properties would necessitate powers (by grounding them), even though there would not
be necessitation in the other direction (from the power to the property). However, this
denial of essential dependence would push the grounding theorist further away from
some of the orthodox versions of necessitarianism discussed in Sect. 2, which typically
have to deny the possibility of the multiple realization of powers. For example, if
properties and powers are identical, it is clear that the same power cannot be correlated
Footnote 27 continued
metaphysical explanations are circular. In other words, their proposal is that relations of ontological depen-
dence are non-symmetrical rather than symmetrical. This means that the grounding theory I am proposing is
consistent with what Barnes and Thomson say, given that they do not claim that relationships of ontological
dependence go in both directions in all cases.
28 Yates (2013, Sect. 4) also argues that there are good reasons for dispositional essentialists to adopt a
Finean primitivist conception of essence. Wildman (2013), in contrast, argues in favour of a sophisticated
modal conception of essence, and suggests that facts about essence are analysable in terms of metaphysical
necessities of a specific kind. I lean towards Fine’s view that essential dependence is primitive, but due
to space limitations I cannot pursue this debate further here. What is important for our purposes is that
relations of essential dependence entail metaphysically necessary connections, even if the reverse is not
true.
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with different properties (unless identity is contingent, which Kripkeans typically
deny).
I shall not attempt to the settle the question of multiple realizability here given that
my main aim is to explore the conceptual landscape of necessitarianism. However, it
is worth noting that even if no actual cases of the multiple realization of powers are to
be found, this is compatible with there being multiple realization across different non-
actual possibilities. For example, if there could be alien qualities that ground certain
types of power that we find in our world, this would be enough to sever the connection
between grounding and essential dependence in the current context.29
5 Are the grounding theories anti-humean?
The aim of this section is to situate the grounding theories discussed so far within
the debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans. Given that Humean metaphysics
is typically characterized by its rejection of necessary metaphysical connections in
nature, as expressed by Hume’s Dictum, one might naturally assume that the grounding
theory of powers is an anti-Humean position. However, as we shall see, this issue is
not quite as straightforward as it appears. Moreover, contemporary Humeanism is
typically associated with a thesis about properties known as quidditism, and on the
grounding theory of powers there is at least one sense in which properties—on which
natural modality supervenes—are quidditistic.
As Wilson (2010) explains, the rough formulation of Hume’s Dictum is as follows:
‘HD: There are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct,
intrinsically typed, entities’ (2010, p. 598)
Now, if ‘distinct’ just means ‘non-identical’, then it seems clear that the grounding
theory of powers violates Hume’s Dictum and provides an anti-Humean view. For as
we saw earlier, the claim that a certain property grounds a certain power is incompatible
with the claim that that property is identical with that power. Hence, properties and
powers are numerically distinct on the grounding view. However, as Wilson argues
(2010, p. 602), it is implausible to think that the notion of distinctness at work in Hume’s
Dictum amounts to nothing more than non-identity, for this would leave Humeans with
a principle that is implausibly strong. For example, sets are non-identical with their
concrete members, but surely no sensible Humean would deny that sets are necessarily
constituted by their members. Surely, when Humeans uphold Hume’s Dictum, they
do not intend to bring such uncontroversial cases of necessity into question. What this
suggests, then, is that the notion of distinctness at work in Hume’s Dictum must be
stronger than mere numerical distinctness.
29 There is also another sense in which we might say that powers are multiply realizable (or not). If we
opt for a trope theory of qualitative properties, where tropes are particulars, we can ask whether a specific
power of an object is essentially dependent on the particular qualitative property (trope) that grounds it.
If it is not, then the power is multiply realizable by different tropes. The answer to this question is likely
to depend in part on whether tropes are transferable. If indiscernible tropes can be freely swapped around
(metaphysically speaking), then it might be quite natural to allow that an object’s power could have been
grounded in a distinct (indiscernible) quality trope.
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In a 2008 paper about Hume’s Dictum and its application in the realm of prop-
erties, Stoljar considers four possible interpretations of distinctness which are all
stronger than the notion of mere numerical distinctness (i.e., non-identity): weak
modal distinctness, strong modal distinctness, mereological distinctness and essence-
distinctness. We shall not discuss mereological distinctness here because, as Stoljar
(2008, pp. 266–267) notes, this notion is typically applied in cases involving material
objects rather than properties. Hence, it is not clear that a version of Hume’s Dictum
based on mereological distinctness could be generalized to properties. This leaves
the weak modal, strong modal, and essence-based interpretations. As we shall see,
whether or not the grounding theories of powers violate Hume’s Dictum depends on
which of these notions of distinctness is in play. If Hume’s Dictum is formulated in
terms of weak modal distinctness, then some grounding theories violate it while others
do not. If Hume’s Dictum is based on strong modal distinctness, then the grounding
theories do not violate Hume’s Dictum. Finally, if Hume’s Dictum is formulated using
an essence-based notion of distinctness, then some grounding theories violate it while
others do not.
Let us start with the definitions of these three notions of distinctness as presented
by Stoljar (2008, pp. 265–268):
‘Weak modal distinctness: F is weakly modally distinct from G if and only if it is
possible that F is instantiated and G is not or it is possible that G is instantiated
and F is not’ (2008, p. 265)
‘Strong modal distinctness: F is strongly modally distinct from G if and only
if it is possible that F is instantiated and G is not and it is possible that G is
instantiated and F is not’ (2008, p. 266)
‘Distinctness in essence: F is distinct in essence from G just in case the essence
of F is wholly distinct from the essence of G’ (2008, p. 267)
As the definition above indicates, entities can be weakly modally distinct even if one of
the entities in question necessitates the other. That is, if the existence of F necessitates
the existence of G, F and G will still be weakly modally distinct as long as the existence
of G does not necessitate the existence of F. This will be the case if, for example, G
is a multiply realizable state. In contrast, in order for two entities—F and G—to be
strongly modally distinct, there must not be necessitation in either direction, meaning
that F can exist without G and vice versa. Clearly, then, weak modal distinctness does
not entail strong modal distinctness, but strong modal distinctness entails weak modal
distinctness.
Using these two notions of distinctness we can now generate two different versions
of Hume’s Dictum:
HD (WEAK) There are no metaphysically necessary connections between weakly
modally distinct, intrinsically typed, entities.
HD (STRONG) There are no metaphysically necessary connections between
strongly modally distinct, intrinsically typed, entities.
How then do these versions of Hume’s Dictum play out in the case of the grounding
theories of powers, discussed in Sects. 3 and 4? The grounding theory accepts that
properties necessitate powers (by grounding them), but we saw how there is wriggle
room on the question of whether powers are multiply realizable. If a power is essentially
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dependent on a certain property, then the power will not be multiply realizable. The
power will necessitate the relevant property as well as vice versa. Importantly, this
means that if a grounding theorist accepts that powers are essentially dependent on the
properties that ground them, then properties and powers will not be weakly modally
distinct. Therefore, such a view will be perfectly consistent with HD (WEAK). If
properties and powers are not weakly modally distinct, then they simply do not fall
under the scope of HD (WEAK). So, a version of the grounding theory which denies the
multiple realizability of powers will be consistent with Humeanism, if by ‘Humean’
we mean that HD (WEAK) is preserved. In contrast, if a grounding theorist accepts the
multiple realizability of powers, then properties and powers will be weakly modally
distinct. Properties and powers would then fall under the scope of HD (WEAK), and
since the grounding theorist does posit a metaphysically necessary connection from
property to power (the necessity of grounding), then HD (WEAK) will be violated.
Hence, if a grounding theorist accepts the multiple realizability of powers, the theory
will be anti-Humean, if by ‘Humean’ we mean that HD (WEAK) is preserved.
As Wilson (2010, pp. 602–603) notes, however, it is unlikely that many self-
certifying Humeans would want to commit to HD (WEAK), because like the
‘non-identity’ version of HD, there seems to be clear counterexamples to it. For exam-
ple, determinates (like ‘is scarlet’) and determinables (like ‘is red’) are weakly modally
distinct (since determinables are multiply realizable) and yet it seems overwhelmingly
plausible that determinates necessitate the corresponding determinable. Hence, when
considering whether the grounding theories are Humean, a more interesting question
is whether they violate versions of HD based on strong modal distinctness or essence-
based distinctness, since these versions are more likely to be what serious Humeans
have in mind.30
In the case of HD (STRONG), the status of the grounding theory of powers is clear.
The grounding theories discussed in Sects. 3 and 4 do not violate HD (STRONG)
because they do not accept that properties and powers are strongly modally distinct.
Given that a property grounds a certain power, the power cannot fail to exist if the prop-
erty does. Hence, properties and powers do not fall under the scope of HD (STRONG).
This means that the grounding theories are consistent with Humeanism, if by ‘Humean’
we mean that HD (STRONG) is preserved.
Finally, let us consider the non-modal version of HD which is based on the notion
of essence:
HD (ESSENCE) There are no metaphysically necessary connections between intrin-
sically typed entities whose essences are wholly distinct.
As in the case of HD (WEAK), whether or not the grounding theory violates HD
(ESSENCE) depends on its stance regarding the essential dependence of powers on
properties. As discussed earlier, power types are always individuated, at least in part,
by their relational modal profile. However, as we have seen, the grounding theorist has
the option to insist that power types are also essentially dependent on the properties
that ground them, thereby ruling out the multiple realization of powers. But if that
option is taken, it seems that the qualitative properties and the powers they ground
30 Wilson also discusses the extent to which the various versions of Hume’s Dictum are analytically true.
Due to space limitations I will not discuss this issue here, nor will I attempt to answer the question of which
version of Hume’s Dictum is the most popular one in the Humean literature.
123
Synthese
will not have wholly distinct essences, since the power will essentially involve that
very quality. The upshot is that if this essential dependence claim is accepted by the
grounding theorist, then properties and powers will not be distinct in the way described
by HD (ESSENCE). Hence, HD (ESSENCE) would not be violated by properties and
powers on that view, since they would not fall under the scope of the principle. Such
a view would therefore be consistent with Humeanism, if by ‘Humean’ we mean that
HD (ESSENCE) is preserved.
Unsurprisingly, the outcome is different if the grounding theorist rejects the essential
dependence of powers on properties and accepts that powers are multiply realizable.
Once we sever the essential dependence of powers on properties, there is then no
reason to think that the essences of properties and powers overlap. Properties will have
a qualitative quidditistic essence (more on this below) while powers will have a purely
modal essence. In that case, HD (ESSENCE) would clearly be violated: properties and
powers would have distinct essences but the former would metaphysically necessitate
(i.e. ground) the latter. Hence, if a grounding theorist accepts the multiple realizability
of powers, then the theory will be anti-Humean, if by ‘Humean’ we mean that HD
(ESSENCE) is preserved.
To round off this section, let us move away from Hume’s Dictum and consider
other ways in which the grounding theories might (or might not) be considered to be
in the general spirit of Humean metaphysics. Contemporary Humeanism is closely
associated with the metaphysical principle of Humean Supervenience, as popularized
by Lewis (1986). According to this principle, all metaphysical phenomena—includ-
ing facts of natural modality—supervene on nothing more than ‘the spatiotemporal
arrangement of local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties’ (Lewis 1986, p.
ix). Within this framework, the local qualities do not have a dispositional essence
but rather a primitive, self-contained identity. Some make this point by saying that
properties are quidditistic.31
Interestingly, there seems to be much about this Humean Supervenience project that
grounding theorists about powers can agree with, even though the latter formulate their
positions using the notion of grounding rather than supervenience. We saw earlier how
properties are primitive qualities on the grounding theory, albeit qualities that ground
powers. One can therefore describe the theory as a version of quidditism. Moreover,
given that the grounding theory is a version of strong actualism, its proponents will
surely be happy to say that facts of natural modality globally supervene on the worldly
arrangement of properties. At first glance, then, the grounding theories seem to be
in the spirit of Lewisian Humean Supervenience. There are, however, other ways in
which the grounding theories depart from the contemporary Humean project. The
most obvious difference is that, unlike Lewisians, the grounding theorists accept a
more local grounding or supervenience claim, which is that specific properties fully
ground specific powers.32 And as we shall now see, grounding theorists might also
diverge in some ways from the Lewisian understanding of quidditism.
31 Lewis makes the further claim that these properties ‘need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated’ (Lewis 1986, p. ix). Some critics argue that this stipulation clashes with findings in quantum
mechanics but for our purposes we need not discuss this debate.
32 I am grateful to a referee for emphasizing this point.
123
Synthese
As Smith (2016, p. 240) points out, Lewis sometimes appears to view quidditism
primarily as a principle about the possibility of free recombination/permutation of
properties: ‘Quidditism is the premise that tells us that the permutation is indeed
a different possibility. Two different possibilities can differ just by the permutation
of fundamental properties’ (Lewis 2009, pp. 209–210). Smith (2016, p. 240) refers
to this version of quidditism as ‘recombinatorial-quidditism’, to convey that it is a
modal thesis about how the mosaic of properties can be freely rearranged in other
possible worlds. The other version of quidditism, mentioned above, is a thesis about
the non-dispositional, primitive identity of properties, which Smith (2016, p. 239) calls
‘individuation-quidditism’. Smith observes that recombinatorial-quidditism probably
entails individuation quidditism, because if a property were individuated modally,
as it is on the dispositional essentialist conception of properties, restrictions would
surely be imposed on how properties can be arranged in other possible worlds. But
interestingly for our purposes, it is less plausible that individuation-quidditism entails
recombinatorial-quidditism (Smith 2016, p. 241). The grounding theories introduced
in Sects. 3 and 4 illustrate why. These theories accept individuation-quidditism but it
is less clear that a grounding theorist should accept recombinatorial-quidditism. Since
properties ground powers, and given that we are assuming grounding necessitarianism,
it follows that a property must confer the same power(s) in any world in which it is
instantiated. And this fact will surely impose constraints on how properties are arranged
in various possible worlds.33 What all this shows is that the grounding theories are
Humean in the sense that they accept individuation-quidditism, but anti-Humean in
the sense that they are likely to reject recombinatorial-quidditism, which is a core
feature of the Lewisian Humean project.
To summarize, in response to the question of whether the grounding theories are
Humean, the answer is: it depends on what we mean by ‘Humean’. The grounding
theories accept one version of quidditism but reject another. And some versions of the
grounding theory violate some versions of Hume’s Dictum, while others do not.
6 Other options: necessitarianismwith grounding in the opposite
direction
In this section and the one to follow, we shall briefly identify further variants of the
kinds of necessitarianism covered so far. Until now we have been discussing a theory
on which the properties of things are more fundamental than, and the grounds of, the
powers of those things. For the purposes of this paper I am assuming the orthodox view
that grounding is asymmetric. So, if properties ground powers, it cannot be that powers
also ground properties. However, another option for the necessitarian is to deny that
properties ground powers and to posit a grounding relation in the opposite direction,
which is to say that the powers of things ground the properties of those things. Although
I find this grounding claim less plausible than the alternative, there has been a small
33 It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to settle the question of just how strong those constraints are.
As mentioned in footnote 3, dispositionalist anti-Humeans disagree on whether powers necessitate their
manifestations. If a grounding theorist accepts that powers do necessitate their causal manifestations, then
it seems Hume’s Dictum will be violated. I am grateful to Wolfgang Swarz for emphasizing this point.
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number of philosophers who are happy to take natural modal facts to be fundamental.
For example, Lange (2009) accepts an ontology of fundamental subjunctives, and if
one thinks that powers are closely tied to subjunctives (as, for instance, Bird does) then
Lange’s subjunctive facts might look a lot like primitive powers. With such a view in
play, one could then ground properties in subjunctive facts by, for example, accepting
the view developed by Whittle called ‘causal nominalism’ (Whittle 2009), on which
properties are sets of objects that share certain primitive subjunctives in common.
Are there other versions of this approach that have realist rather than nominalist
aspirations? I believe there are. Mumford’s ‘cluster’ theory (2004) could be interpreted
in this way. According to a proposal explored by Mumford, universals are nothing
more than clusters of powers, and one way of spelling this out is to say that properties
are mereologically composed of powers (Mumford 2004, p. 171). If one denies that
composition is identity, it seems that such a view amounts to a grounding theory:
properties are grounded in clusters of fundamental powers.
7 Other options: necessitarianismwith essentialist emergence
Once we clearly distinguish grounding and essential dependence, other possible ver-
sions of necessitarianism present themselves. We can, for example, conceive of cases
of essential dependence that do not involve grounding. Some cases of emergence
arguably have this feature.34 Emergent entities are sometimes defined as fundamental
entities that are necessarily ontologically dependent (see e.g. Barnes 2012). On this
view, we can think of the concept of fundamentality as more to do with ungroundedness
than independence. Plausibly, emergent entities are not grounded in their emergent
base: the base does not fully explain the emergent entity and is not sufficient for it. As
Barnes puts it, God has to do more than just create an emergent base in order to cre-
ate an emergent entity (2012, p. 885). Nonetheless, emergent entities are necessarily
dependent on other things. And if an emergent entity is not multiply realizable, the
ontological dependence in question might well be essential dependence: perhaps it is
part of the essence of, say, emergent mental states that they emerge from brains rather
than lumps of concrete.
These observations raise the following possibilities: Firstly, perhaps the proper-
ties of things emerge from their powers. This would be a case in which properties
essentially depend on powers but where the former are not grounded in the latter
(or in anything else). Alternatively, the essential dependence could go in the other
direction, such that ungrounded powers are essentially dependent on properties. It is
unclear whether either of these views has ever been held but perhaps Shoemaker’s
1998 position could be interpreted as the view on which properties essentially depend
on powers but are not grounded in them. Shoemaker seems to be a dispositional essen-
tialist about properties but also suggests in later work that properties are ‘categorical
bases’ (1998, p. 65). This could be interpreted as the claim that property instantiations
are ungrounded categorical states which are essentially dependent on powers. Some
critics have struggled to make sense of Shoemaker’s 1998 position (e.g. Armstrong
34 I am grateful to José Tomas Alvarado for discussion of this issue.
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2004, p. 139; Mumford 2008) and a speculative diagnosis of their puzzlement could
be that these commentators have not noticed that this position is an emergentism of
sorts.
8 Formalizing the new necessitarianisms
Now that we have introduced a variety of versions of necessitarianism, we are in a
position to formalize the differences between them and represent the possibilities using
the table at the end of this section. According to Kit Fine, facts about grounding and
essential dependence reveal how things are constituted. Hence, to say that Socrates’
singleton is essentially dependent on Socrates is to say that Socrates is an essential
constituent of that set (see e.g. Fine 1995b, p. 275). More recently, Fine (2015) also
speaks of grounding in terms of constitution, as a way of providing unified foundations
for essence and ground. Hence, grounding entities are said to be constitutively sufficient
for that which they ground, while in cases of essential dependence the dependee is
constitutively necessary for the depender.
After capturing grounding and essence in these terms, Fine introduces two sentential
connectives to express them. First, essential dependence, or constitutive necessity, is
represented by a right-to-left arrow (Fine 2015, p. 299):
ϕ ← ψ (1)
This formula indicates that ψ is essentially dependent on ϕ, or that ϕ is constitutively
necessary for ψ. Grounding (constitutive sufficiency) is then represented by a left-to-
right arrow (Fine 2015, p. 302):
ϕ → ψ (2)
This formula indicates that ϕ (fully) grounds ψ, or that ϕ is constitutively sufficient
for ψ. Finally, where we have a case of both grounding and essential dependence (i.e.,
where one state of affairs is constitutively necessary and sufficient for another), Fine
uses a double-headed arrow:
ϕ ↔ ψ (3)
This formula says both that ϕ grounds ψ and also that ψ is essentially dependent
on ϕ. Or, to put it more elegantly, ϕ is constitutively necessary and sufficient for ψ. If
what was said earlier is correct, then we have a correct instance of (3) if ϕ expresses
the existence of Socrates and ψ expresses the existence of Socrates’ singleton set.
One way of stating the grounding theory of powers that we started with in Sect. 3,
then, is to use Fine’s terminology and say that the (qualitative) properties of things are
constitutively sufficient for their powers. If one takes the further step of denying the
possibility of the multiple realization of powers, as discussed in Sect. 4, then one can
say that the properties of a thing are both constitutively necessary and sufficient for its
powers. Let us call this the ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers, since it accepts that
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powers necessitate properties as well as vice versa. I shall not go as far as to say that
Fine’s framework provides the only way of fleshing out the varieties of necessitarian-
ism that we have discussed, but as we shall see below, making use of Fine’s concepts
is useful in several ways. For example, it brings out in a clear way the similarities and
differences between the widely held identity theory of properties (discussed in Sect. 2)
and this ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers.
Returning to formula (3) above, the strong grounding theory of powers would
say that a true instance of (3) can be obtained by replacing ϕ with a proposition
that ascribes a certain property (quality) or properties to an object, and replacing
ψ with a proposition about a certain power (or powers) that the object has. Let us
formalise the property ascription as ‘Px’ and the power ascription as ‘Dx’ (I choose
the letter ‘D’ since I am using the terms ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ interchangeably).
Px would therefore represent a property ascription such as ‘x is charged’, while Dx
would represent a power ascription such as ‘x has the power to repel’.35 The strong
grounding theory of powers can then be characterized by the following formula:
Px ↔ Dx (4)
If we accept that properties ground powers but powers are not essentially dependent
on properties (thereby allowing the possibility of the multiple realization of powers),
we are left with formula (5):
(Px → Dx) ∧ ¬(Px ← Dx) (5)
However, some care is needed when formalizing the theories in this way. The
metaphysical notions of constitutive necessity and sufficiency have very different
characteristics to the purely logical notions of necessity and sufficiency. Hence it must
be emphasized that in (2) and (3) above the connectives are not the material conditional
and biconditional respectively. The language here is not that of classical logic. As well
as the fact that the connectives above express metaphysically necessary connections,
another important difference is that the classical logical notions of necessary conditions
and sufficient conditions are converses of one another. So, for instance, if one can
say that being Socrates is sufficient for being a man, then one can equally say that
being a man is necessary for being Socrates. In contrast, it is not plausible to think that
constitutive necessary conditions and constitutive sufficient conditions are converses of
one another in this way. If they were converses, then if it were true thatϕ groundsψ (i.e.,
that ϕ is constitutively sufficient for ψ), it would follow that ϕ is essentially dependent
on ψ (i.e., that ψ is constitutively necessary for ϕ). However, as we saw earlier, it
is very difficult to think of a case of grounding in which this metaphysical structure
obtains. Certainly, in the Finean example discussed earlier, of singleton Socrates, it
would be odd to say both that Socrates grounds singleton Socrates and that Socrates
is essentially dependent on singleton Socrates.
35 Again, I shall not commit here on what kind of modal fact is expressed by a power ascription. If the
Birdian approach is taken, then Dx will be equivalent to a subjunctive, such as ‘x would repel a similarly
charged particle if it were in close proximity’.
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There is another important difference between constitutive necessary and sufficient
conditions (essence and ground), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of clas-
sical logic. As we saw earlier, the orthodox view is that relationships of grounding
and essential dependence are asymmetric, which stems from the fact that such rela-
tionships are determinative and explanatory (though in different senses). This implies
that statements of constitutive necessary and sufficient conditions (‘ϕ ↔ ψ’) carry an
asymmetry that we do not find in statements of biconditional equivalence. Where ‘↔’
is interpreted as the classical truth-functional connective, there will be a symmetry
such that if ϕ ↔ ψ is the case, then ψ ↔ ϕ is the case. This is not so in the case
of constitutive necessary and sufficient conditions. Under the current framework, if
the qualitative properties of things are constitutively necessary and sufficient for their
powers, we cannot then say that the powers of a thing are constitutively necessary
and sufficient for the qualitative properties of the thing. This is ruled out because, as
highlighted earlier, we are assuming it is metaphysically incoherent to say that qualita-
tive properties ground powers and vice versa, or that qualitative properties essentially
depend on powers and vice versa.
One reason why the previous paragraph is important is that it reveals the sense in
which the ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers, expressed in (4) above, is distinct from
the powerful qualities ‘identity’ theory discussed in Sect. 2. If qualitative properties
are identical with powers, then of course powers are identical with qualitative prop-
erties. In contrast, if the qualitative properties of a thing are constitutively necessary
and sufficient for its powers, then it is not the case that its powers are constitutively
necessary and sufficient for its qualitative properties. Putting the point in another way,
qualitative properties are ontologically prior to powers on the strong grounding theory
of powers, whereas on the identity theory qualities and powers are on a metaphys-
ical par. It is important to emphasize, though, that the ‘strong’ grounding theory of
powers carries the same modal consequences as the identity theory. Since relations of
grounding and essential dependence hold necessarily if they hold at all, then it follows
on the ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers that the qualitative properties of things
necessitate they that have certain kinds of power and also that the powers of things
necessitate that they have certain qualitative properties. Importantly, then, this strong
grounding theory is not a radical departure from some of the versions of necessitari-
anism discussed in Sect. 2. Given that the powerful quality theorists’ identity claim is
difficult to sustain, for reasons given earlier, the ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers
is one that proponents of the powerful qualities theory should find attractive. Indeed,
Heil himself seems to unwittingly lean in the direction of a grounding theory of powers
when he says that ‘things do what they do because they are as they are’ (Heil 2012,
p. 80).36 I think the grounding approach captures this kind of explanation much better
than Heil’s own identity theory. For if properties are identical with powers, it’s difficult
to see how properties can explain powers.
36 In a recent paper, Coates (2020) also articulates the powerful qualities theory in terms of grounding
and argues that this allows the powerful qualities theorists to distinguish themselves from pure powers
theorists (contra Taylor 2018). Coates’s article was published online when this paper was in the final stages
of publication and I am not able to give it the attention it deserves. I shall merely note that Coates’s theory
appears to have much in common with what I have called the ‘strong’ grounding theory of powers.
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Px  Dx Dx  Px Dx  Px  Px  Dx Allows the 
multiple 
realization
of 
powers? 
Properties 
necessitate 
the powers? 
Powers 
necessitate 
the 
properties? 
The grounding theory 
of powers (without 
essential dependence). 
Standard dispositional 
essentialism (arguably 
incoherent). 
The strong grounding 
theory of powers. 
Properties essentially 
emerge from powers.   
The grounding theory 
of properties (with 
essential dependence 
of properties on 
powers).  
The grounding theory 
of properties (without 
essential dependence). 
Powers both ground 
properties and are 
essentially dependent 
on them (arguably 
incoherent).  
Powers essentially 
emerge from 
properties.  
Fig. 1 The conceptual space of necessitarianism using grounding and essential dependence
With Fine’s formalizations of constitutive sufficiency (grounding) and constitu-
tive necessity (essential dependence) in play, we can now present the new spectrum
of necessitarian theories based on the framework of grounding and essential depen-
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dence. It should be noted again that relations of grounding and essential dependence
are taken to be asymmetric. However, if symmetric grounding or symmetric essen-
tial dependence are coherent notions, as Barnes (2018) and Thompson (2016) have
recently argued, then the table could be expanded to include cases in which proper-
ties and powers necessarily mutually ground or depend on each other. In that case
I would welcome further discussion of those other theories too. Regarding notation,
recall that ‘Px’ represents qualitative property predication, such as ‘x has mass’, while
‘Dx’ represents power predication, such as ‘x has the power to gravitationally attract’.
These predicates should be read in as flexible a way as possible so that, for example,
they could be shorthand for conjunctions of properties or powers. This is because,
again, a grounding theorist about powers might allow that a single property grounds
multiple powers, in which case ‘Dx’ may be read as shorthand for a conjunction of
powers (which will in turn represent a complex modal fact). Please note also that, as
explained above, the arrows in the formulas do not represent connectives in classi-
cal truth-functional logic, but rather the metaphysical notions of ground and essential
dependence. Finally, as noted in the first column of the table, rows 3 and 8 are arguably
incoherent for reasons discussed in Sect. 2. This leaves 6 coherent forms of necessi-
tarianism in the table (Fig. 1).
9 Conclusions
The dominant forms of necessitarianism anchor claims about metaphysically neces-
sary connections in nature in the idea that properties are identical with, or essentially
dependent on, powers. These necessitarian theories face problems that are familiar in
the recent literature and I believe it is time to explore new forms of necessitarianism.
The concepts of metaphysical grounding and essential dependence open up space for
doing just that. In this paper I have explored this conceptual space in detail and com-
pared the resultant versions of necessitarianism with existing literature on properties
and powers. My hope is that this will provide a platform for important work on a new
necessitarian research programme. This, in turn, will influence a range of discussions
in ontology and theories of modality.
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